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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Timothy Isiah Jones appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin and
possession of paraphernalia. Jones argues that the district court erred during trial by admitting
evidence that Jones was on probation. Jones also contends the court erred by admitting a knife
found on Jones into evidence. Finally, Jones argues that the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On April 25, 2017, Boise City Police Department officers were conducting surveillance
on a trailer home, where they suspected a fugitive was hiding. (2/20/18 Tr., p.134, Ls.6-11;
p.137, L.24 – p.138, L.3.) The officers also suspected there was illegal drug activity going on “in
that area.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.134, Ls.11-13.)
One of the officers secured a prime, though unorthodox, location for surveilling the
trailer: he entered a nearby hair salon and, with permission of the owners, positioned himself in
“a little bathroom that was converted into a broom closet.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.137, Ls.2-20.) The
broom closet “had a two-by-two window” with a great view of “the trailer [they] were there to
watch,” which was “no more than 20 to 30 feet” away. (2/20/18 Tr., p.137, L.19 – p.138, L.20.)
The “completely hidden” officer saw a car “that was running … and parked directly in
front of” the trailer they were surveilling. (2/20/18 Tr., p.138, L.15 – 139, L.6.) A passenger and
a pit bull were inside the car. (2/20/18 Tr., p.139, Ls.7-14.) Soon after that, the officer saw a
man (later determined to be Jones) leave the trailer, walk to the driver’s side of the car, and reach
“underneath the front seat of the vehicle,” “like he was looking for something.” (2/20/18 Tr.,
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p.143, L.23 – p.144, L.12.) Jones went back inside the trailer, then briefly stepped outside again
and yelled at the passenger. (2/20/18 Tr., p.144, Ls.13-24.) The passenger “got out [of the car]
and went up,” then went inside the trailer with Jones. (2/20/18 Tr., p.144, L.12 – p.145, L.1.)
Later on, the passenger left the trailer, returned to the vehicle, and reached into the “exact same
place underneath the seat” Jones had reached into. (2/20/18 Tr., p.145, Ls.8-14.) The passenger
“retrieved something from under the seat” and returned with it to the trailer. (2/20/18 Tr., p.145,
L.13 – p.146, L.2.) The officer recognized the object was a “plastic digital scale” that was
commonly used in illegal drug transactions. (2/20/18 Tr., p.145, L.24 – p.148, L.16.)
Jones and the passenger left the trailer and went back into their car. (2/20/18 Tr., p.148,
Ls.20-25.) Jones drove away and officers in multiple patrol cars began following him. (2/21/18
Tr., p.230, L.11 – p.231, L.14.) Law enforcement eventually observed Jones driving “50 in a 35”
mile-per-hour zone, so they initiated a traffic stop. (2/21/18 Tr., p.178, L. 9 – p.179, L.9.)
Officer Bourgeau was one of the first officers to make contact with Jones. (See State’s
Ex. 5A, 1 00:00-00:45.) Several things made him nervous from the start. Jones “immediately
opened” the driver’s side door, would not face Officer Bourgeau, and “had his hands around his
waistband” – all of which naturally “caused [the officer] great concern” for his safety. (State’s
Ex. 5A, 00:43-01:03; 2/21/18 Tr., p.180, Ls.15-18; p.185, L.23 – p.186, L.24.) Jones kept
“trying to face away” from Officer Bourgeau, which also contributed his suspicion. (2/21/18 Tr.,
p.189, Ls.1-10.) Jones eventually got on his knees and Officer Bourgeau handcuffed him for
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Officer Bourgeau’s on-body video, admitted into evidence and published at trial as State’s
Exhibit 5, is subdivided into two separate video files in the record. (2/21/18 Tr., p.185, Ls.9-19;
p.197, Ls.3-9.) The state’s briefing will refer to the 04:43-length video as “State’s Ex. 5A” and
the 05:16-length video as “State’s Ex. 5B.”
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“[o]fficer safety” – because “[i]f there’s something going on, reaching, hiding, it’s better if his
hands are under control.” (2/21/18 Tr., p.188, Ls.8-23.)
Officer Bourgeau asked Jones if he had “any weapons on [him].” (State’s Ex. 5A, 02:4302:45; 2/21/18 Tr., p.190, Ls.9-12.) Jones initially lied and responded, “Sir, no I don’t.” (State’s
Ex. 5A, 02:45-02:46; 2/21/18 Tr., p.190, Ls.9-12.)

Bourgeau pat searched Jones and felt

something in Jones’s pocket. (State’s Ex. 5A, 02:54-02:59.) When asked what it was, Jones
admitted he had a knife. (State’s Ex. 5A, 02:54-02:59.) Bourgeau pulled the knife out of Jones’s
“right pants pocket.” (2/21/18 Tr., p.190, Ls.13-31.)
At around the same time a law enforcement K-9 alerted on Jones’s car. (2/21/18 Tr.,
p.191, Ls.18-22.) Officers searched the car and found a digital scale, and some tinfoil with
several small items that appeared to be “heroin packaged up individually.” (2/21/18 Tr., p.191,
L.23 – p.192, L.19.)
The officers also discovered that Jones was on felony probation, and learned that Jones
had a Fourth Amendment Waiver for law enforcement searches. (State’s Ex. 5B, 00:36-01:10;
2/20/18 Tr., p.158, L.13 – p.159, L.7.) The officers eventually searched Jones, at Jones’s
probation officer’s behest (State’s Ex. 5B, 00:36-02:44), and at that point the prior evasive
behavior “all made sense”:
During that time, I had a conversation with Corporal Bourgeau. I don’t recall
specifically the circumstances, however. Ultimately I just remember being in a
position to assist him and conduct a search of the Defendant.
Q. And we’ve seen you in the video. It looks like you have gloves on?
A. Correct.
Q. And so I’d like to have you walk us through the search of the Defendant that
took place there next to Officer—I should say Corporal Bourgeau’s patrol car.
And describe for us what you did and what you located.
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A. Okay. During that time, I conducted a thorough search of the Defendant, his
pockets, clothing, interior areas of his clothing, and ultimately removed what I
believed to be tar heroin from within the interior area of his clothing near his
groin.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.223, L.17 – p.224, L.12; p.232, L.22 – p.233, L.15.) State lab testing verified that
the bag contained 30.96 grams of heroin. (2/21/18 Tr., p.304, L.11 – p.305, L.23.)
The state charged Jones with trafficking heroin and with possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.31-32.) Jones filed a motion to suppress (R., pp.76-87), alleging that the
traffic stop was pretextual and unlawfully extended, that there “was no objectively reasonable
basis for conducting the patdown” search, and that the stop was improperly converted into a de
facto arrest without probable cause (R., pp.83-86). The district court denied Jones’s motion. 2
(R., pp.136-37, 184-89.)
On the morning of trial defense counsel brought up a “concern” that “Jones was on felony
probation at the time that the events of his arrest took place,” and Officer Bourgeau’s on-body
video referred to Jones being on probation. (2/20/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-8 (citing State’s Ex. 5B,
00:33-00:59).) Defense counsel contended there was “no reason at all why the State needs to
refer to the fact that he’s on probation,” because “the jury’s decision has nothing to do with the
legal grounds for the search, has nothing to do with justifying the search.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.13,
Ls.7-12.) Counsel’s concern was that jurors would speculate about why Jones was on probation,
and that “under Idaho Criminal Rule 401, 403,” evidence or testimony about Jones’s probation

2

Despite Jones’s halfhearted statement of fact that “at the outset of the encounter, the officers
abandoned the traffic violation” (Appellant’s brief, p.2), the motion to suppress is not before this
Court on appeal. Jones does not appeal from any issue raised in the motion to suppress, nor does
he claim the district court erroneously ruled on the motion. (See Appellant’s brief.)
4

was “simply more prejudicial … than it is probative of any issue in this case.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.14,
Ls.3-24.)
The state responded that “the State too is entitled to a fair trial, and from the State’s
perspective the defendant’s probation status is relevant because as your Honor knows, that is one
of the reasons the defendant’s person, including his crotch area, which is a very private area, is
searched by the police.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-7.) In other words, the state contended, the
probation evidence “is part of the entire story, explains the officers’ actions, and it explains,
frankly, why the officer is sticking his hands down the defendant’s pants.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.18,
Ls.20-23.) With respect to any potential undue prejudice, the state argued that the court could
give “a limiting instruction … if deemed so appropriate.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.9.)
The district court concluded the probation evidence was admissible; but, it would not
allow the state to “go into what the actual probation is for, whether it’s felony, misdemeanor,
anything else….” (2/20/18 Tr., p.19, L.19 – p.20, L.24.) The district court then took a short
recess “to do some additional research,” after which it clarified the basis of its decision:
… [A]long the same lines of this question of … probation, it’s mentioned …
inside the video. We analyzed it under 401 and 403, and under 404, as [an]
additional part of the analysis, 404(b), evidence of other crimes. It’s arguable that
mentioning probation is evidence of the crimes, there has to have been another
crime previously done. That’s not what is being done here, it’s not being admitted
for that purpose. I think the State’s argument is correct it’s just to show the
context of the search, and therefore under 404[(b)](2), it’s also under my
discretion and I’ll allow it.
(2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.10 – p.23, L.6.)
In keeping with the court’s ruling, the state admitted and published Officer Bourgeau’s
on-body video, in which the officer mentions Jones’s probation status. (See State’s Ex. 5B,
00:33-00:59.) The state additionally elicited testimony that Jones was on probation. (See, e.g.,
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2/20/18 Tr., p.158, L.13 – p.159, L.4.) The district court repeatedly gave the jury a limiting
instruction, informing them that probation testimony was “being admitted for, among other
things, so you can understand the circumstances surrounding the stop,” but that “[t]hat’s the only
basis for its admission.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.162, Ls.6-20; 2/21/18 Tr., p.197, Ls.14-22; p.284, Ls.110; R., p.174.)
The state’s evidence additionally included Exhibit 12—the knife that Officer Bourgeau
found on Jones’s person. (2/21/18 Tr., p.208, L.15 – p.209, L.25.) Jones objected to the
admission of the knife. (2/21/18 Tr., p.209, Ls.6-16.) The district court overruled the objection
and later explained why it did so:
The third sidebar was concerning the admission of State’s Exhibit 12. At sidebar,
Mr. Chastain told me that he objected, and it was on the basis of inflaming the
jury. I considered it under Rule 403 and found that there was prejudice; there was
not unfair prejudice. And also that, therefore any unfair prejudice did not
outweigh its probative value.
In that regard, knives are commonly used in drug transactions, and it’s relevant to
show that, and therefore it’s also admissible under 401. That was the analysis I
did in my head.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-22.)
The jury found Jones guilty of trafficking heroin and possession of paraphernalia.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.372, p.17 – p.373, L.16; R., pp.182-83.) The district court sentenced Jones to 30
years imprisonment, fixing 15 years. (R., p.201.) Jones timely appealed. (R., pp.205-08.)
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ISSUES
Jones states the issues on appeal as:
I.
II.
III.

Did the district court err by admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that Mr.
Jones was on probation?
Did the district court err by admitting the knife into evidence at trial?
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Jones failed to show the district court erred by admitting evidence that Jones was on
probation, or, in the alternative, was any such error harmless?

II.

Has Jones failed to show the district court erred by admitting the knife into evidence, or,
in the alternative, was any such error harmless?

III.

Has Jones failed to show the district court imposed an excessive sentence?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
Jones Fails To Show The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence That Jones Was On
Probation; Alternatively, Any Such Error Was Harmless
A.

Introduction
Jones argues the district court erred by admitting the officers’ testimony and other

evidence showing Jones was on probation. He contends the evidence was inadmissible at trial
because it was irrelevant and that any prejudice from its admission “substantially outweighed any
probative value of the evidence.” (Appellant’s brief, p.10 (emphasis and capitalization altered).)
Jones further argues, for the first time on appeal, that the state failed to provide 404(b) notice
prior to the admission of the evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) Lastly, Jones cites to State
v. Kralovec 161 Idaho 569, 573-74, 388 P.3d 583, 587-88 (2017), and argues that the probation
testimony is inadmissible “res gestae” evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-15.)
These arguments all fail. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that testimony elicited “to
explain … police officers’ actions” is relevant and admissible. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,
445-46, 180 P.3d 476, 484-85 (2008). And if such testimony omits “any discussion whatsoever
of the underlying crimes,” and is not “offered to prove [a] propensity” to commit crimes, it does
“not fall under the exclusionary purview” of Rule 404(b). Id. at 445, 180 P.3d at 484 (2008).
The probation testimony here was precisely that. Moreover, Jones fails to show the probation
testimony, delivered with a limiting instruction, was improperly prejudicial.
Furthermore, Jones’s late-breaking 404(b)-notice argument is not preserved on appeal and
in any event fails on the merits. Jones’s attempt to cast the probation testimony as inadmissible
res gestae evidence likewise fails because it is not preserved. And even if it is preserved, Jones’s
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res gestae argument misinterprets Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74, 388 P.3d at 587-88, and would
create an unworkable evidentiary standard going forward.
In the alternative, even if the probation testimony was erroneously admitted under any of
the above theories, any such error was harmless.
B.

Standard Of Review
When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the appellate court

applies an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 375 P.3d 279 (2016)
(citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d 816, 819-20
(2002)). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, the appellate court considers
whether the trial court “correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (quoting Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)).
Whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,
764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993).
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether the
evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given free review while the
determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,
51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).
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C.

The Probation Testimony Was Not Inadmissible Propensity Evidence; Moreover, It Was
Relevant To Explain The Police Officers’ Actions
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence that tends to

prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has any tendency to make the
existence of that fact more probable than it would be without the evidence is relevant. State v.
Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). “Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity. However, such
evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).” State v.
Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted to prove motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993). In Grist, the Idaho
Supreme Court set forth a two-tiered analysis to determine the admissibility of evidence under
I.R.E. 404(b). State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138, 267 P.3d 721, 725 (Ct. App. 2011). “The
first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the
prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” Id. (citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d
at 1188).
The Idaho Supreme Court has already considered whether testimony explaining a police
search would be inadmissible propensity evidence under Rule 404(b). In State v. Yakovac, the
Court heard a consolidated appeal from a post-conviction summary dismissal. 145 Idaho at 440,
180 P.3d at 479. The petitioner argued on appeal that “her counsel was ineffective for … failing
to object to testimony that she was arrested on outstanding warrants.” Id. at 444, 180 P.3d at
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483. The petitioner likewise took issue with her own counsel “for mentioning” the warrants,
which she claimed were “inadmissible [evidence] under I.R.E. 404(b).” Id. at 444-45, 180 P.3d
at 483-84.
The Yakovac Court began with Rule 404(b). The Court noted that the “mention of the
warrants did not include any discussion whatsoever of the underlying crimes,” and that the
testimony was not “offered to prove Yakovac’s criminal character or that by possessing the
methamphetamine she was acting in conformity with her criminal character.” Id. at 445, 180
P.3d at 484. Moreover, the testimony was not “offered to prove Yakovac’s propensity to possess
methamphetamine.” Id. Therefore, the Court concluded, the warrant testimony did not “fall
under the exclusionary purview of I.R.E. 404(b).” Id.
Turning to Rule 401 and relevance, the Yakovac Court then asked “whether the warrants
were relevant to a material and disputed issue.” Id. The Court concluded they were:
The warrants were relevant evidence inasmuch as they were of consequence to the
search and subsequent discovery of the pipe underlying Yakovac’s charge of
possession of methamphetamine. That is to say, the warrants were not relevant to
the possession of methamphetamine charge itself, but rather to explain the police
officers’ actions. The pipe was found during a search incident to arrest.
However, Yakovac was not initially a suspect; instead, she approached the police
officers as a complaining witness. Yakovac’s arrest due to the outstanding
warrants explains why the search incident to arrest leading to the discovery of the
methamphetamine was conducted. The jury never heard the underlying charges
relating to the outstanding warrants.
Id. at 446, 180 P.3d at 485 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
The Yakovac Court thus found that counsel was not ineffective for discussing, and not
objecting to, the warrant testimony—because “the warrants were admissible for the limited
purpose of explaining Yakovac’s arrest and subsequent search of her truck.” Id. at 487, 180
P.3d at 448 (emphasis added).
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The Yakovac decision controls the outcome here. Just like the warrant testimony in
Yakovac, the district court concluded that the probation testimony was “not being admitted” to
show character or propensity under 404(b). (2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.19 – p.23, L.6.) And just like
the warrant testimony in Yakovac, there was “no discussion whatsoever” about the underlying
crimes for which Jones was on probation. (See 2/20/18 Tr., p.118, Ls.17-24; p.158, L.13 –
p.159, L.13; State’s Exs. 5A, 5B; 2/21/18 Tr., p.259, L.19 – p.260, L.11.) Moreover, the
probation testimony was not offered to prove Jones’s criminal character, a tendency for him act
in conformity with that character, or any propensity to possess heroin or any other illegal
substance. (2/20/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-25; p.18, Ls.18-23.)
Rather, the evidence was explicitly offered and admitted for a single, permissible
purpose: to explain the propriety of an otherwise inexplicable police search. (2/20/18 Tr., p.16,
Ls.2-25; p.18, Ls.18-23.) The police officer stuck his hand down Jones’s pants and into his
underwear, rummaged around in Jones’s crotch, and retrieved drugs. (2/20/18 Tr., p.159, Ls.925; 2/21/18 Tr., p.233, Ls.2-15.) Absent some legal justification any juror would conclude that
this search would be improper at best and illegal at worst. Because the search was justified, and
because the probation testimony was admitted to explain that to the jury, the testimony did not
“fall under the exclusionary purview of I.R.E. 404(b).” Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 445, 180 P.3d at
484.
By the same token, the district court correctly concluded the probation testimony was
relevant. (2/20/18 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.) Just like the warrant testimony in Yakovac, the probation
testimony was relevant because of its “consequence to the search and subsequent discovery” of
the heroin; in other words, it “explained the police officers’ actions.” See Yakovac, 145 Idaho at
446, 180 P.3d at 485. Without the probation testimony, the jury would have simply heard that
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the police officer stuck his hands down Jones’s underwear and fished around, without any
justification or permission, until he found drugs. (2/20/18 Tr., p.159, Ls.9-25; 2/21/18 Tr., p.233,
Ls.2-15.) Hearing about this search without any context paints an obviously warped picture of
what actually occurred and would taint any juror’s perceptions of the police and the search. This
is precisely why the Yakovac Court concluded that evidence “explain[ing] the police officers’
actions” is relevant and admissible “for the limited purpose of explaining” a search of a
defendant. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 446, 180 P.3d at 485. The probation testimony was relevant
and admissible for the exact same reason.
On appeal Jones fails to show any error. Below, Jones never expressly argued that the
probation testimony was impermissible propensity evidence—in fact, he never mentioned, much
less expressly argued from, Rule 404(b). (2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.2 – p.19, L.18.) Jones now
appears to make the argument, for the first time 3 on appeal, that the probation testimony is
impermissible propensity evidence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.) He also claims, as he did
below, that the probation testimony is irrelevant because “[t]estimony regarding Mr. Jones’ status

3

Below Jones alluded to the probation evidence “lead[ing] to” improper “inference[s]” of
criminality, but this was always couched as a Rule 403 argument—not a 404(b) argument.
(2/20/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-18.) In any event, Jones’s 404(b) claim may nevertheless be preserved
because it was actually decided by the district court. Below, the district court noted that the
probation testimony was “not admissible to prove the character of a person, to show the person
acted in conformity therewith,” but it concluded that “I think the state’s argument is correct it’s
just to show the context of the search, and therefore under 404[(b)](2), it’s also under my
discretion and I’ll allow it.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.19 – p.23, L.6 (emphasis added).) Issues that
are “argued to, or decided by, the district court it can form the basis for review by this Court.”
State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019) (drawing a “distinction between issues
not formally raised below and issues that ‘never surfaced’ below”). To the extent the court’s
ruling “surfaced” the issue of whether the probation testimony was impermissible propensity
evidence under 404(b), that issue has likely been preserved for appellate review.
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as a probationer is irrelevant to the issue of whether Mr. Jones possessed drug paraphernalia or
heroin.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10 (capitalization and emphasis altered).)
But in light of controlling precedent these claims both fail. The district court concluded
that the probation testimony was not offered to show Jones’s propensity to act in conformity with
a criminal character; rather, it was admitted for the relevant limited purpose of “explain[ing] the
police officers’ actions.” (2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.20 – p.23, L.6.) Both of these conclusions were
correct in light of State v. Yakovac, which Jones has not bothered to distinguish or challenge on
appeal. 4

Because a straightforward application of binding Idaho Supreme Court precedent

affirms the district court’s analysis, Jones fails to show any error.

D.

Considered Alongside The Repeated Limiting Instructions, Any Prejudice From The
Probation Testimony Did Not Substantially Outweigh Its Probative Value
The second step in a 404(b) analysis involves a determination of whether the evidence,

although relevant, should be excluded because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65
(2003). Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the district court’s
discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice—which is the tendency to suggest a decision on an
improper basis—substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150
Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908
(Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993).
“Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed

4

Jones cites to Yakovac for a separate statement of law so he appears to be aware of the case.
(See Appellant’s brief, p.9.) But he has declined to take on the holding from Yakovac that
torpedoes his argument: that evidence such as warrant testimony, like the probation testimony, is
relevant “to explain the police officers’ actions.” 145 Idaho at 446, 180 P.3d at 485.
14

by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of
relevant evidence.” State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990)
(emphasis in original).
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in the sense
of being detrimental to a party’s case. See State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599,
604 (1989) (”Certainly that evidence was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all
evidence in a criminal trial is demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus
results in prejudice to a defendant.”). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that is
unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis.
Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. As long as the evidence is relevant to prove some
issue other than the defendant’s character and its probative value for the proper purpose is not
substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v.
Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999).
Here, the district court carefully considered whether the probation testimony would be
unfairly prejudicial to Jones:
THE COURT: Okay. I believe [the probation testimony] is admissible under
401—actually, it’s relevant under 401, that does have a tendency to make any fact
more likely or not. The question is under 403 and whether or not I believe it’s
prejudice to [Jones]. The question is [whether it is] unfair prejudice and the
question is does the unfair prejudice substantially outweigh the probative value.
The underlying issue is it’s a probation. The allegation here—there is no way for
a jury to know how long ago it is, what the crime is. A lot of people have
probation, a large number of people in America can be on probation and it can be
for a completely unrelated fact, and I think [the prosecutor’s] argument is welltaken[;] you have a two-part search, some invasiveness and that is a fact to be
considered in the magnitude of what the unfairness [is] to [defense counsel’s]
case.
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So I’ll allow it. I will take the motion to say that’s as far as it goes to what the
video will show about it, it won’t go into what the actual probation is for, whether
it’s felony, misdemeanor, anything else, unless, [defense counsel], you want to put
that in play. If you want to open that door, I’ll let you do so but I’m not going to
let [the prosecutor put] that in play. We’ll let the video stand where it stands and
leave that door closed unless [defense counsel] opens it.
(Tr., p.20, L.4 – p.21, L.4.)
In keeping with this ruling the jury never heard why Jones was on probation. (See
2/20/18 Tr., p.118, Ls.17-24; p.158, L.13 – p.159, L.13; State’s Exs. 5A, 5B; 2/21/18 Tr., p.259,
L.19 – p.260, L.11.) And at Jones’s request, the district court repeatedly cautioned the jury to
“give no weight” to the probation testimony “in determining whether [Jones] committed any
crimes here as part of this trial.” (See 2/20/18 Tr., p.162, Ls.6-20; 2/21/18 Tr., p.197, Ls.14-22;
p.284, Ls.1-10; R., p.174.) The court instead informed the jury that the probation evidence was
to be considered “so that you understand the circumstances of the stop.” (2/21/18 Tr., p.197,
Ls.18-20.) This culminated in the formal limiting instruction that the jury received before
deliberation:
INSTRUCTION NO. 22
During the trial, some evidence was admitted where you were admonished that it
could not be considered by you for any other purpose other than the limited
purpose for which it was admitted.
Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for
which it was admitted.
(R., p.174.)
“Juries are presumed to follow the instructions given by the court,” State v. Hall, 163
Idaho 744, 807, 419 P.3d 1042, 1105 (2018), and here, the jury was properly instructed that it
could only consider the probation testimony for the limited purpose of explaining the search to
the jury. In light of the carefully circumscribed way the probation testimony was presented,
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Jones fails to show the district court erred when it concluded that any unfair prejudice did not
substantially outweigh the probative value.

E.

Jones’s Res Gestae Argument Was Not Preserved Below; But Even If Preserved, It Fails
On The Merits Because It Misinterprets Idaho Precedent And Invites An Unworkable
Evidentiary Standard Going Forward
For the first time on appeal Jones argues that the district court incorrectly admitted the

probation testimony by performing an improper res gestae analysis. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1415.) This argument fails first as a threshold matter because it was not preserved below. The
district court did not admit the probation testimony under “res gestae” or any other common law
theory; it admitted it under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. (2/20/18 Tr., p.20, L.4 – p.21, L.4;
p.22, L.10 – p.23, L.6.) Jones, likewise, never argued that the evidence was inadmissible res
gestae. (See 2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.2 – p.19, L.18.) And while defense counsel below may have
made a similar-looking argument below by claiming “[t]he State doesn’t need to justify the
search to the jury,” this was not enough to preserve res gestae as an issue on appeal. (See
2/20/18 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-16; p.14, Ls.3-11.)
Preservation is not a game of horseshoes; parties are required to do more than aim in the
general direction of a theory and get close to it. Rather, “parties will be held to the theory upon
which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271,
275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (emphasis added). A party may press an “evolved” argument on
appeal, because (speaking of horses), “a party riding on a horse that has been groomed and
reshod for the appellate process” is proper. State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, ___, 439 P.3d 1267,
1271 (2019), reh’g denied (May 17, 2019). But it is improper to enter “the appellate process
riding a similar-looking but entirely new horse” by arguing an entirely new theory. Id. (emphasis
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added). Because Jones’s res gestae argument raises an entirely new theory, and rides an entirely
new horse, it has not been preserved and should be put out to pasture.
Even if Jones’s res gestae argument is preserved it fails on the merits. Jones argues that
admitting the probation testimony to show “the ‘context of the search’ is simply another way of
saying ‘res gestae,’ a theory of admissibility [that] was recently rejected” in Kralovec, 161 Idaho
569, 388 P.3d 583. (Appellant’s brief, p.14.) Jones thinks this was improper because “[t]he jury
did not need additional information regarding ‘the circumstances of the stop’ to determine
whether Mr. Jones possessed a trafficking amount of heroin.” (Appellant’s brief, p.15.)
This argument fails because it misapprehends the holding of Kralovec. The Kralovec
Court was not barring the admission of all otherwise admissible evidence that would have been
res gestae under the common law. Rather, the Court was simply barring evidence that would
have been admissible under the common law theory of res gestae—but that was now inconsistent
with the Idaho Rules of Evidence. See Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 573-74, 388 P.3d at 587-88.
A brief historical detour will help sharpen this distinction. In State v. Blackstead, 126
Idaho 14, 878 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994), the Idaho Court of Appeals examined the roots of “res
gestae”:
Res gestae is defined in part as: “The whole of the transaction under investigation
and every part of it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). The
term is most often used in connection with Rule of Evidence 803(2), the “excited
utterance” exception to the hearsay rule. See generally, 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al.,
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 268, at 206-208 (John W. Strong, ed., 4th ed.
1992). It has been otherwise used, however, with reference to an exception to the
general prohibition against use of other misconduct evidence. In this context, res
gestae refers to other acts that occur during the commission of or in close
temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to “complete
the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly
contemporaneous happenings.” 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 799.
McCormick suggests the use of the term “res gestae” in this context is
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inappropriate and that the term “complete story principle” would be more
appropriate. Id. at 800, n. 13.
Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 17-18, 878 P.2d at 191-92 (emphasis added).
The Kralovec Court later explained that some of the concepts contained within the
common-law res gestae theory eventually found themselves codified in the Idaho Rules of
Evidence:
In 1979, the Board of Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar appointed the Idaho
Evidence Committee (Committee) to review the Idaho law of evidence and rules
of evidence from other jurisdictions and draft rules of evidence for Idaho. M.
Clark, Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, Preface, p. 1 (revised
1985). In the commentary to its recommendation for the adoption of Idaho Rule of
Evidence 803, the Committee found that “Idaho does not have a statute or rule
allowing admission of statements, otherwise hearsay, as present sense
impressions. However, Idaho case law does recognize the doctrine of res gestae
which serves to admit many of the statements.” M. Clark, Report of the Idaho
State Bar Evidence Committee, C 803, p. 2 (revised 1985). Similarly, the
Committee determined that “Idaho has no statute or rule providing for the excited
utterance exception. The exception has, however, been recognized and applied by
the Idaho courts and is generally discussed in terms of res gestae.” M. Clark,
Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, C 803, p. 3 (revised 1985).
161 Idaho at 574, 388 P.3d at 588.
The Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee commentary additionally revealed that the
“Committee considered [Idaho Rules of Evidence 803(1) through (3)] encompass the
admissibility of evidence through various exceptions to the rule against hearsay which were
previously allowed under the loosely defined doctrine of res gestae.” Id. In other words, the
Rules of Evidence now incorporated what was previously set forth as “res gestae” in common
law. See id. The Kralovec Court accordingly concluded, “[b]ased on this and the subsequent

shift away from the doctrine in favor of the Rules of Evidence,” that “evidence previously
considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the criteria established by
the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” Id. (italics in original, boldface added).
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The takeaway from Kralovec is plain: evidence previously considered res gestae is still
potentially admissible.

See id.

But like any other type of evidence—regardless of its

admissibility at common law—it is now “only admissible if it meets the criteria established by”
the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Id.
A straightforward application of this rule shows that the probation testimony here was
ultimately admissible. Regardless of whether the probation testimony would have been
admissible under res gestae at common law, it was nevertheless admissible here because met the
criteria found in the Idaho Rules of Evidence. We know this because the Yakovac Court—
applying the Idaho Rules of Evidence and not a “res gestae” theory—concluded that warrant
testimony is admissible to explain police actions, which is precisely what the probation testimony
here was admitted for. 145 Idaho at 445-46, 180 P.3d 484-85. Thus, the probation testimony
was admissible under the rules of evidence, regardless of whether it would have also been res
gestae at common law.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s most recent examination of res gestae affirms that this is
correct. In State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 436 P.3d 683 (2019), the Court reviewed a lower-court
decision to admit evidence that the defendant did not have a driver’s license. Id. at ___, 436 P.3d
at 694. Based on that record it was “not clear what test the district court used to determine the
admissibility of the lack of a driver’s license.” Id.
“However,” the Jeske Court noted, “the [district] court’s use of the phrase ‘intertwined
with other issues’” suggested the lower court used “an improper res gestae analysis.” Id. The
Court pointed out that it had “recently rejected res gestae as a standard for admitting evidence
and concluded that evidence is only admissible if it meets the criteria established by the Idaho
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Rules of Evidence.” Id. (italics in original, boldface added). Because the record there only
showed that the district court deployed a res gestae analysis the evidence was inadmissible:
Under current case law, the district court would have committed error in admitting
the evidence under a theory of res gestae. As evidence can no longer be admitted
under res gestae, any admission of the evidence as res gestae would be improper.
Id. at ___, 436 P.3d at 695.
Jeske is inapplicable to this case because the district court here did not rely on res gestae
to admit the probation testimony. No one ever mentioned res gestae, much less did the court use
res gestae (or any other common-law theory) to conduct its analysis. (2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.2 –
p.23, L.7.) Moreover, unlike the lower court in Jeske, the district court made the proper basis of
its analysis crystal clear: it was relying on the Idaho Rules of Evidence. (2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.19
– p.23, L.6.) While the district court did mention the “context of the search,” it did so not to
conduct a res gestae analysis, but to point out the basis for admission under Rule 404(b). (See
2/20/18 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.) And the Yakovac case affirms that this was a correct interpretation of
the rules of evidence. 145 Idaho at 445-46, 180 P.3d at 484-85. In sum, the district court here
correctly concluded the evidence was admissible per the Idaho Rules of Evidence; and under
Kralovec and Jeske the evidence was therefore still admissible, even if it would have been
considered “res gestae” at common law.
Jones’s reading of Kralovec departs from all of this. Jones appears to conclude any
evidence that would have been res gestae at common law is now inadmissible per se—even if it
would otherwise be admissible under the Rules of Evidence. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)
Jones’s absolutist take is that admitting evidence to show the “context of the search” is a “theory
of admissibility which was recently rejected” in Kralovec.

(Appellant’s brief, p.14 (citing

Kralovec, 161 Idaho at 574-74).) This goes hand in hand with Jones’s relevance argument: that
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“[w]hether Mr. Jones was on probation, and whether the terms of his probation included a Fourth
Amendment waiver was relevant only to the lawfulness of the search of his person, which was
not at issue in the trial. The issue at trial was whether Mr. Jones possessed a trafficking amount
of heroin and drug paraphernalia.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.10 (emphasis added).)

This

uncompromising position, beyond being contrary to Kralovec, would be unworkable. Prohibiting
all contextual evidence would invariably lead to trials being conducted in an evidentiary vacuum.
Take this case: under Jones’s purist approach facts such as the officers’ names, which
agencies they work for, the way in which surveillance operations are typically conducted, the
facts surrounding this particular surveillance operation, why an officer was in a hair salon (by
permission, not by appointment), the time of day, the kind of car Jones was driving, the fact that
Jones was driving at all, and so on, would all be inadmissible. 5
Instead, under Jones’s rule, the jury would have only been allowed to hear that some
nameless humanoid searched Jones; somewhere in Ada County, Idaho, on April 25; and found a
substance later verified to be 28 grams or more of heroin. (See R., p.163.) Perhaps the jury
could have seen the few seconds of the officer’s on-body video showing the moment the heroin
was found. But the rest of the video would need to be redacted into oblivion, because it also
shows, in impermissible technicolor, the “context of the search.” The trial would conclude
shortly after it began and the confused jury could retire with its half-a-dozen facts to deliberate
before lunchtime. Some on the panel might cheer the brisk timeline. But none of the jurors

5

And Jones himself seems to agree that facts like these are necessary to discuss this case, insofar
as he has included many of them, down to a detailed discussion of the make and model of
Jones’s car (which was a black, or maybe blue, Volvo), in his statement of facts in this appeal.
(See Appellant’s brief, p.2, n.2.) One can only assume he did so for the same reason both parties
discussed them below: because it is impossible to coherently talk about any isolated event—such
as the time police found drugs in Jones’s underwear—without some context.
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would have the key to understanding an otherwise befuddling event: some facts explaining why
or how the police found heroin in Jones’s underwear that day.
Banning evidence explaining the “context of the search” would require conducting trials
in a void. Luckily, Jones’s impractical standard is not what the Kravolec Court had in mind. Per
Kravolec, “evidence previously considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets
the criteria established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” 161 Idaho at 574, 388 P.3d at 588
(italics in original, boldface added). Because the probation testimony comfortably meets the
criteria established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence, interpreted by the Yakovac Court, it was
admissible here. Jones fails to show otherwise.

F.

Even If The District Court Erred By Admitting The Probation Testimony, Any Such Error
Was Harmless
Alternatively, even if the district court erred by admitting the probation testimony, any

error was harmless. There is no reasonable possibility that the probation testimony contributed to
the verdict here. We know this because Jones’s own attorney conceded that the state’s evidence
satisfied nearly every element of the conviction. (See 2/21/18 Tr., p.363, L.17 – p.364, L.21.)
Defense counsel’s concession came during closing arguments, when he literally invited the jury
to convict Jones of the lesser-included charge of possessing heroin:
[Defense counsel]: Now, am I going to say that you need to find Tim Jones not
guilty? I wish I could. You’ve seen a lot of this on video. You’ve heard from
Mr. Jones’ own words. He’s a big boy. But he was really straight when he said,
“Hey, that’s just for me. That’s just what I use.” I think it’s really clear it was for
personal use.
So ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you, while I don’t like to ask a jury to
convict my client of anything, you need to unanimously reject the trafficking
count and find him guilty of simple possession of heroin. There is a reasonable
doubt that the amount is correct. There is a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jones had
any other intent than to simply use this drug for himself.
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Now, as the State pointed out in [Jones’s] own words, it’s evil, it’s a bad drug.
It’s led him to a bad place. He’d certainly rather be anywhere than here. But you
can do justice. You can do the right thing. You can do your job by convicting him
of simple possession of heroin.
He had the scale. I don’t deny that. I suppose there is a basis for a conviction
there too.
So please, when you go back, Mr. Jones is entitled to your individual decision as
you guys deliberate together. He’s entitled to a fair verdict. And I submit to you
the fair verdict is guilty of simple possession of heroin.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.363, L.17 – p.364, L.21 (emphasis added).)
Jones’s own counsel conceded that the state proved its case with respect to four out the
five elements of trafficking heroin (and all the elements of paraphernalia possession). (See R.,
pp.31, 163.) And Jones’s concession was not based on the probation testimony; rather, it was
based on the video evidence and Jones’s own confession. (2/21/18 Tr., p.363, L.17 – p.364,
L.21.) After Jones conceded the state had satisfied these elements, all that was missing to prove
trafficking was the weight. (See R., pp.31, 163.)
We can therefore rest assured that the probation testimony did not contribute to the
verdict. That is because there was nothing about the probation testimony that went to the only
contested element at trial—the weight of the heroin. The jury was not told that Jones was on
probation for trafficking (nor was he). (See 2/20/18 Tr., p.118, Ls.17-24; p.158, L.13 – p.159,
L.13; State’s Exs. 5A, 5B; 2/21/18 Tr., p.259, L.19 – p.260, L.11.) And there is nothing inherent
about probation that would have gone towards whether Jones’s heroin weighed 28 grams or
more. The fact that Jones was previously on probation simply had nothing to do with the weight
of heroin he possessed. And because Jones himself conceded the state comfortably proved the
rest of the elements, there is no doubt that the probation testimony had no effect on the verdict.
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Accordingly, even if the probation testimony was erroneously admitted, any such error
was harmless.

G.

Jones’s Failed To Preserve His 404(b)-Notice Challenge, Which Fails On The Merits In
Any Event Because Any Error Was Harmless
The parties below never conceived of the probation testimony as 404(b) evidence. The

state never filed a 404(b) notice in anticipation of admitting the evidence; Jones likewise never
filed a 404(b) motion to exclude the evidence. (See R.) Jones’s only grounds for exclusion,
raised in his eleventh-hour argument on the morning of trial, were that the probation testimony
was irrelevant and overly prejudicial. (2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.2 – p.14, L.24; p.15, Ls.9-18; p.19,
Ls.1-18; p.21, Ls.5-8.) Jones never explicitly argued that the probation testimony should be
excluded because it was barred by 404(b), and, in fact, never specifically mentioned 404(b) at all.
(See 2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.2 – p.23, L.8.)
It is therefore unsurprising that the district court did not conduct a 404(b) analysis when it
first examined the probation testimony.

The district court initially analyzed the probation

testimony strictly in terms of relevance and unfair prejudice, which is how Jones’s impromptu
motion and the state’s response framed things. (2/20/18 Tr., p.20, L.4 – p.21, L.4.) It was only
later, after having “a chance to do some additional research,” that the court conducted the
following analysis, sua sponte:
… [A]long the same lines of this question of … probation, it’s mentioned …
inside the video. We analyzed it under 401 and 403, and under 404, as [an]
additional part of the analysis, 404(b), evidence of other crimes. It’s arguable
that mentioning probation is evidence of the crimes, there has to have been
another crime previously done. That’s not what is being done here, it’s not being
admitted for that purpose. I think the State’s argument is correct it’s just to show
the context of the search, and therefore under 404[(b)](2), it’s also under my
discretion and I’ll allow it.
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(2/20/18 Tr., p.22, L.10 – p.23, L.6 (emphasis added).) The parties, and the district court, never
mentioned Rule 404(b) again. (See 2/20/18 Tr.; 2/21/18 Tr.; R.)
Now, for the first time on appeal, Jones has made an argument based on Rule 404(b): he
argues that “the state failed to provide timely notice of its intent to use I.R.E. 404(b) propensity
evidence.” (Appellant’s brief, p.15 (emphasis and capitalization altered).) This argument is
plainly not preserved because Jones never made it below. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275,
396 P.3d at 704. Below Jones never mentioned Rule 404(b) at all—much less did he specifically
argue that the state had failed to provide proper notice, or that he was prejudiced as a result. (See
2/20/18 Tr., p.13, L.2 – p.23, L.8.) Because Jones’s notice argument has not been preserved it
should be rejected as a matter of course.
Alternatively, even if Jones has preserved his 404(b)-notice claim, it fails on the merits.
Failure to give 404(b) notice does require the automatic undoing of a conviction. Rather, this
Court applies a harmless error standard to determine the consequence of failing to provide 404(b)
notice. See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230-31, 178 P.3d 28, 33-34 (2007) (finding
“the admission of evidence was not harmless error” because defendant’s prior statements
“regarding his past dealings in methamphetamine” were “highly prejudicial” and of “low”
probative value, and because the fact that “Sheldon dealt smaller amounts of methamphetamine
in the past does not lead to the conclusion he knew there was a pound of the substance under his
car seat.”). To find harmless error a reviewing court must “declare a belief, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction.” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 156, 177 P.3d 362, 371 (2008)).
Here, as already explained, there is no reasonable possibility that the probation testimony
contributed to the conviction. That is because Jones’s own attorney conceded nearly all the
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elements of the crime (via his invitation to find Jones guilty of heroin possession), and the
probation testimony had no bearing on the only element that was not conceded: the weight of the
heroin. (2/21/18 Tr., p.363, L.17 – p.364, L.21.) Moreover, the state produced ample evidence
at trial that showed Jones was guilty of trafficking heroin.

Because the admission of the

probation testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt the failure to give 404(b) notice
could not have been reversible error.

II.
Jones Fails To Show The District Court Erred In Admitting The Knife Into Evidence;
Alternatively, Any Such Error Was Harmless
A.

Introduction
The state moved to admit the knife found in Jones’s pocket into evidence and the district

court granted the motion after concluding that “knives are commonly used in drug transactions.”
(2/21/18 Tr., p.209, Ls.6-21; p.237, Ls.10-21.) Jones argues this was an error because “the knife
was not relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative of any material fact, and it impermissibly
was being used to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury by showing Mr. Jones as a
dangerous criminal.” (Appellant’s brief, p.17.)
Jones fails to show error. The district court concluded that “knives are commonly used in
drug transactions”—a finding that Jones has not contested on appeal. (See Appellant’s brief.)
Based on this uncontested finding the possession of a knife was undoubtedly relevant, because it
made it more likely that Jones possessed drugs. The knife was additionally relevant because it
showed Jones was not credible, which the state explicitly argued below. (2/21/18 Tr., p.365,
Ls.1-23.) Moreover, Jones fails to show the admission of the knife was unfairly prejudicial on
appeal.
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Alternatively, even if the district court erred in admitting the knife into evidence, any
such error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Jones, 160

Idaho 449, 375 P.3d 279 (citing Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 163-64, 45 P.3d at 819-20). To determine
whether a trial court abused its discretion, the appellate court considers whether the trial court
“correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.” Id. (quoting Perry, 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P.2d at 821). Whether evidence
is relevant is reviewed de novo. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 764, 864 P.2d at 602.

C.

The Knife Was Relevant And Not Unfairly Prejudicial
The officer who searched Jones found a knife, which the state later moved to admit into

evidence over Jones’s objection. (2/21/18 Tr., p.208, L.15 – p.209, L.21.) Following an offrecord sidebar the district court overruled the objection and the knife was admitted into evidence.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.209, Ls.6-16.) Later, the district court explained Jones’s objection and the court’s
ruling in detail:
The third sidebar was concerning the admission of State’s Exhibit 12. At sidebar,
Mr. Chastain told me that he objected, and it was on the basis of inflaming the
jury. I considered it under Rule 403 and found that there was prejudice; there was
not unfair prejudice. And also that, therefore, any unfair prejudice did not
outweigh its probative value.
In that regard, knives are commonly used in drug transactions, and it’s relevant to
show that, and therefore it’s also admissible under 401. That was the analysis I
did in my head. I didn’t say that at sidebar.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.237, Ls.10-22.)
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On appeal Jones fails to show any error. The district court concluded that “knives are
commonly used in drug transactions,” and Jones has not argued that this finding was incorrect.
(See Appellant’s brief.) Based on this uncontested finding the knife was undoubtedly relevant;
because if knives are commonly used in drug transactions then Jones’s possession of the knife
makes it more likely that he participated in such transactions.
Jones argues that “the presence of a knife does nothing to establish any material facts in
this case” because “the State did not have to prove a drug transaction took place.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.19.) But this myopic view of relevance misses the point: by definition, people who
participate in drug transactions are more likely to possess drugs; because one cannot transact
something without possessing it (either pre- or post-transaction). And Jones does not contend, as
a matter of fact, that the district court erred when it concluded that “knives are commonly used in
drug transactions.” (See Appellant’s brief.) The knife was therefore relevant to the question of
whether Jones possessed drugs, which was clearly a question before the jury.
The knife was relevant for an additional reason. It showed Jones’s lack of credibility.
“Evidence relating to the credibility of a witness is always relevant,” State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho
900, 926, 354 P.3d 462, 488 (2015), and as the state pointed out in closing argument, the knife
showed that Jones lied to police:
[Defense counsel] just told you that the Defendant was straight with the officers.
So let’s think about that for a second.
Was the Defendant being straight with the officers when he noticed them behind
him and he concealed 30.96 grams of heroin down the front of his pants with guns
drawn on him? Is that the Defendant being straight with the police? Is the
Defendant being straight with the police when he tells Officer Bourgeau, when
Bourgeau asks him, “Do you have any weapons on you? Do you have anything
illegal?” right before he does the pat search?
The Defendant says no.
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Is that being straight when the Defendant has a knife concealed on his person in
addition to the heroin?
The Defendant is not being straight with the officers.
(2/21/18 Tr., p.365, Ls.2-20 (emphasis added)).
As the prosecutor correctly pointed out, Jones told police that he did not have any
weapons when, in fact, he did. (State’s Ex. 5A, 02:45-02:46, 02:54-02:59; 2/21/18 Tr., p.190,
Ls.9-12.)

The knife was therefore additionally relevant because it showed Jones was not

credible.
Furthermore, Jones fails to show on appeal that the admission of the knife was unfairly
prejudicial. On appeal he contends the knife “was admitted solely to inflame the passions and
prejudices of the jury—with the hope that they would be fearful of Mr. Jones because he had
such a large, dangerous-looking weapon in his pocket.” (Appellant’s brief, p.19.)
This is pure speculation, as Jones proffers no evidence to support his hyperbolic
conclusion that the prosecutor “hope[d]” to inflame the jurors’ fears. While “appeals to emotion,
passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics” are understandably
forbidden, State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007), appellate
courts will not “lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most
damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning
from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215
P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)). As such,
Jones’s conspiratorial accusation that the knife was admitted “solely to inflame the [jury’s]
passions” with “the hope that they would be fearful” is unfounded, assumes the worst, and should
be rejected. (Appellant’s brief, p.19.)
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Moreover, Jones’s own citation to the augmented record disproves his overwrought
concerns. The photo of the knife, exactly as it was admitted into evidence, shows that even if it
was relatively “large” it was not at all “dangerous-looking”—insofar as it was wrapped in
evidence tape with no visible blade. (Aug., p.1.) Thus, while the knife may have been “big”
relative to the officer’s own weapon (2/21/18 Tr., p.224, Ls.15-19), it was self-evidently not
scary enough to raise an eyebrow, much less inflame passions. (See Aug., p.1.) Because a
pacified taped-up hilt, sans blade, is by definition not “dangerous-looking,” Jones’s speculation
that “[t]his was an inflammatory exhibit seemingly calculated to arouse negative emotions” does
not fit the facts. (Compare Appellant’s brief, p.19 with Aug., p.1.) In any event, Jones fails to
show that the knife was unduly prejudicial or otherwise inadmissible.

D.

Even If The District Court Erred By Admitting The Knife, Any Such Error Was Harmless
Even if the district court erroneously admitted the knife into evidence any error was

harmless. As previously noted, Jones conceded below the state proved every element of the
crime except for one: the weight of the heroin. (2/21/18 Tr., p.363, L.17 – p.364, L.21.) Because
knife possession does nothing to make a particular weight of heroin more or less likely, the
admission of the knife had no reasonable possibility of affecting the verdict.

III.
Jones Fails To Show The District Court Imposed An Excessive Sentence
A.

Introduction
Jones contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.20-23.)

Pointing to his “addiction, substantial support within the

community, good work history, and remorse,” he claims that “given any view of the facts, his
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unified sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed, is excessive.” (Appellant’s brief, p.23.)
Jones fails to show an abuse of sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Anderson, 131

Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144
(1994)).

C.

The District Court Properly Reached A Sentencing Conclusion Within The Bounds Of Its
Discretion
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish that the

sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615
(2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, Jones
must show that his sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136
Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary
objective of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The
Court reviews the whole sentence on appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence
will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568,
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
Jones’s sentence was reasonable and appropriate to achieve the goals of sentencing.
Jones has a lengthy criminal history in multiple states, including a felony conviction for carrying

32

a concealed weapon and a conviction for misdemeanor theft in Ohio (PSI, p.6); convictions for
misdemeanor marijuana possession and resisting and obstructing in Idaho (PSI, p.7); and a
pending misdemeanor marijuana possession charge out of North Dakota (PSI, p.7).
Jones also has a prior felony conviction in Idaho. In 2016, Jones pleaded guilty to
possession of marijuana in excess of 3 ounces. (PSI, p.14.) That case, the state noted at
sentencing, was “strikingly similar” to this one: Jones was stopped for traffic offenses and police
discovered a marijuana in the “front of Jones’s pants above his groin area.” (3/16/18 Tr., p.380,
L.18 – p.381, L.5; PSI, p.5.) In that case Jones “received the benefit of an amendment from
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver,” down to “possession of marijuana
greater than three ounces.” (3/16/18 Tr., p.382, Ls.13-20.) But the circumstances of that case
nevertheless suggested Jones was selling drugs: Jones himself admitted that he “was pulled over
with a qp [quarter pound] of weed”; he described committing the crime as “hard to swallow
because of the fact that I was just trying to pay rent ….” (PSI, p.5.) It was easy to infer that, in
that case, Jones was selling drugs. (See 3/16/18 Tr., p.291, Ls.9-21.)
The same can be said about this case: it is more than “fair to infer from all the evidence, a
digital scale, this trafficking quantity of heroin, the smaller bindle, aluminum tin foil bindle with
the smaller point quantities of heroin inside, that the Defendant was distributing heroin.”
(3/16/18 Tr., p.384, L.23 – p.385, L.3.) All of this naturally weighs against “Jones’s statements
that the amount was for personal use.” (Appellant’s brief, p.23.) And while Jones had some
degree of commendable community support (see, e.g., R., pp.190-91), that does not show that the
district court abused its discretion in sentencing Jones to a fixed term of the mandatory minimum
15 years, with an indeterminate sentence of 15 additional years.
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In sum, based on the facts of this case and Jones’s prior criminal history, Jones fails to
show the district court abused its discretion in sentencing.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2019.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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